Monday, September 10, 2007

Still Criticizing the War on Terror?


September 10, 2007
Still Criticizing the War on Terror?
By Mark Davis

I won't be at Ground Zero on Tuesday. Nor will most of the crowds of media types who joined me in that neighborhood last year.

We attach big anniversaries to roundish numbers: five, 10, 20, 50 and so on. It will be 2011 before another grand reassessment of the dark day that supposedly changed everything.

I say "supposedly" because what strikes me the most as 9/11's sixth anniversary approaches is how little really has changed.

It changed for a while. For a few precious months stretching into early 2002, our nation's differences really did stop at the water's edge, a concept coined 60 years ago by U.S. Sen. Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan.

America's status as a superpower was cemented in the 1940s with victories in a second global war. At that time, Republicans like Mr. Vandenberg and his Democratic colleagues knew that in such a perilous age, politics must be superseded by national interest.

Mr. Vandenberg described an atmosphere that would have been a great boon to post-9/11 America if we were capable of it. "To me," he said, "bipartisan foreign policy means a mutual effort, under our indispensable, two-party system, to unite our official voice at the water's edge so that America speaks with one voice to those who would divide and conquer us and the free world."

Is there anyone who believes such nobility is possible today?

We have not been attacked by al-Qaeda for six years, yet there have been nearly five years of political attacks on every level of our war effort.

Of course, it has been a war pockmarked by many flaws and the attendant debates over strategy. But now we hear debates over withdrawal, which are an enormous boost to an enemy that already seemed exponentially more motivated to win than we are.

But as war debates rage, it is worth measuring where we are on the home front as we observe six years since the day that sparked a new era in world history.

I restrained myself for five years from sharing a belief that the absence of further attacks meant we are doing something right. From 2002 through 2006, I held open the possibility that maybe we were just lucky, or al-Qaeda wasn't as big a deal as we thought, or maybe the terrorists just didn't want to hit us again.

Well, we're not, they are and they do. We are doing something right.

Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff left me cold a few weeks back by blowing off my suggestion that our borders exist to keep out both terrorists and those seeking to take illegal advantage of America's economy. His tone said "don't bother me with people trying to take our jobs; I'm trying to keep out the next Mohamed Atta."

Greedy soul that I am, I want both. But if it's been hard to get serious about the "economic immigrants" (his term), at least we seem to have made it sufficiently difficult for terrorists to fly that next armada of planes into a major city skyline.

Part of that success is a story told within our borders. At our airports, the Transportation Security Administration makes us do some things that make sense and some things that fill Jay Leno monologues. But I'm not in the mood to sneeze at something that has worked.

The rest of our success story is to the credit of the hundreds of thousands of troops from the U.S. and our allies who have taken the fight straight into the gaping maw of the terrorist world.

Yes, al-Qaeda still exists. Yes, there is still an active insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan. That may take a long time to change.

But one question trumps all others. Have we been attacked again on our shores since Sept. 11, 2001? That answer is no, and it is a testament to the honor and sacrifice of all involved in our war effort.

That effort itself is still under constant attack from the portion of America that has grown war-weary. Since we are faced with an enemy that will not tire, one wonders how long we will observe 9/11 anniversaries without a new date arising to share its infamy.

Mark Davis is a columnist for the Dallas Morning News. The Mark Davis Show is heard weekdays nationwide on the ABC Radio Network. His e-mail address is mdavis@wbap.com.

General Petraeus' Report to Congress


Reporting to Congress
By David Petraeus

General David H. Petraeus
Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq

Mr. Chairmen, Ranking Members, Members of the Committees, thank you for the opportunity to provide my assessment of the security situation in Iraq and to discuss the recommendations I recently provided to my chain of command for the way forward.

At the outset, I would like to note that this is my testimony. Although I have briefed my assessment and recommendations to my chain of command, I wrote this testimony myself. It has not been cleared by, nor shared with, anyone in the Pentagon, the White House, or Congress.

As a bottom line up front, the military objectives of the surge are, in large measure, being met. In recent months, in the face of tough enemies and the brutal summer heat of Iraq, Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces have achieved progress in the security arena. Though the improvements have been uneven across Iraq, the overall number of security incidents in Iraq has declined in 8 of the past 12 weeks, with the numbers of incidents in the last two weeks at the lowest levels seen since June 2006.

One reason for the decline in incidents is that Coalition and Iraqi forces have dealt significant blows to Al Qaeda-Iraq. Though Al Qaeda and its affiliates in Iraq remain dangerous, we have taken away a number of their sanctuaries and gained the initiative in many areas.

We have also disrupted Shia militia extremists, capturing the head and numerous other leaders of the Iranian-supported Special Groups, along with a senior Lebanese Hezbollah operative supporting Iran's activities in Iraq.

Coalition and Iraqi operations have helped reduce ethno-sectarian violence, as well, bringing down the number of ethno-sectarian deaths substantially in Baghdad and across Iraq since the height of the sectarian violence last December. The number of overall civilian deaths has also declined during this period, although the numbers in each area are still at troubling levels.

Iraqi Security Forces have also continued to grow and to shoulder more of the load, albeit slowly and amid continuing concerns about the sectarian tendencies of some elements in their ranks. In general, however, Iraqi elements have been standing and fighting and sustaining tough losses, and they have taken the lead in operations in many areas.

Additionally, in what may be the most significant development of the past 8 months, the tribal rejection of Al Qaeda that started in Anbar Province and helped produce such significant change there has now spread to a number of other locations as well.

Based on all this and on the further progress we believe we can achieve over the next few months, I believe that we will be able to reduce our forces to the pre-surge level of brigade combat teams by next summer without jeopardizing the security gains that we have fought so hard to achieve.

Beyond that, while noting that the situation in Iraq remains complex, difficult, and sometimes downright frustrating, I also believe that it is possible to achieve our objectives in Iraq over time, though doing so will be neither quick nor easy.

Having provided that summary, I would like to review the nature of the conflict in Iraq, recall the situation before the surge, describe the current situation, and explain the recommendations I have provided to my chain of command for the way ahead in Iraq.

The Nature of the Conflict

The fundamental source of the conflict in Iraq is competition among ethnic and sectarian communities for power and resources. This competition will take place, and its resolution is key to producing long-term stability in the new Iraq. The question is whether the competition takes place more - or less - violently. This chart shows the security challenges in Iraq. Foreign and home-grown terrorists, insurgents, militia extremists, and criminals all push the ethno-sectarian competition toward violence. Malign actions by Syria and, especially, by Iran fuel that violence. Lack of adequate governmental capacity, lingering sectarian mistrust, and various forms of corruption add to Iraq's challenges.

The Situation in December 2006 and the Surge

In our recent efforts to look to the future, we found it useful to revisit the past. In December 2006, during the height of the ethno-sectarian violence that escalated in the wake of the bombing of the Golden Dome Mosque in Samarra, the leaders in Iraq at that time - General George Casey and Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad - concluded that the coalition was failing to achieve its objectives. Their review underscored the need to protect the population and reduce sectarian violence, especially in Baghdad. As a result, General Casey requested additional forces to enable the Coalition to accomplish these tasks, and those forces began to flow in January.

In the ensuing months, our forces and our Iraqi counterparts have focused on improving security, especially in Baghdad and the areas around it, wresting sanctuaries from Al Qaeda control, and disrupting the efforts of the Iranian-supported militia extremists. We have employed counterinsurgency practices that underscore the importance of units living among the people they are securing, and accordingly, our forces have established dozens of joint security stations and patrol bases manned by Coalition and Iraqi forces in Baghdad and in other areas across Iraq.

In mid-June, with all the surge brigades in place, we launched a series of offensive operations focused on: expanding the gains achieved in the preceding months in Anbar Province; clearing Baqubah, several key Baghdad neighborhoods, the remaining sanctuaries in Anbar Province, and important areas in the so-called "belts" around Baghdad; and pursuing Al Qaeda in the Diyala River Valley and several other areas.

Throughout this period, as well, we engaged in dialogue with insurgent groups and tribes, and this led to additional elements standing up to oppose Al Qaeda and other extremists. We also continued to emphasize the development of the Iraqi Security Forces and we employed non-kinetic means to exploit the opportunities provided by the conduct of our kinetic operations - aided in this effort by the arrival of additional Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

Current Situation and Trends

The progress our forces have achieved with our Iraqi counterparts has, as I noted at the outset, been substantial. While there have been setbacks as well as successes and tough losses along the way, overall, our tactical commanders and I see improvements in the security environment. We do not, however, just rely on gut feel or personal observations; we also conduct considerable data collection and analysis to gauge progress and determine trends. We do this by gathering and refining data from coalition and Iraqi operations centers, using a methodology that has been in place for well over a year and that has benefited over the past seven months from the increased presence of our forces living among the Iraqi people. We endeavor to ensure our analysis of that data is conducted with rigor and consistency, as our ability to achieve a nuanced understanding of the security environment is dependent on collecting and analyzing data in a consistent way over time. Two US intelligence agencies recently reviewed our methodology, and they concluded that the data we produce is the most accurate and authoritative in Iraq.

As I mentioned up front, and as the chart before you reflects, the level of security incidents has decreased significantly since the start of the surge of offensive operations in mid-June, declining in 8 of the past 12 weeks, with the level of incidents in the past two weeks the lowest since June 2006 and with the number of attacks this past week the lowest since April 2006.

Civilian deaths of all categories, less natural causes, have also declined considerably, by over 45% Iraq-wide since the height of the sectarian violence in December. This is shown by the top line on this chart, and the decline by some 70% in Baghdad is shown by the bottom line. Periodic mass casualty attacks by Al Qaeda have tragically added to the numbers outside Baghdad, in particular. Even without the sensational attacks, however, the level of civilian deaths is clearly still too high and continues to be of serious concern.

As the next chart shows, the number of ethno-sectarian deaths, an important subset of the overall civilian casualty figures, has also declined significantly since the height of the sectarian violence in December. Iraq-wide, as shown by the top line on this chart, the number of ethno-sectarian deaths has come down by over 55%, and it would have come down much further were it not for the casualties inflicted by barbaric Al Qaeda bombings attempting to reignite sectarian violence. In Baghdad, as the bottom line shows, the number of ethno-sectarian deaths has come down by some 80% since December. This chart also displays the density of sectarian incidents in various Baghdad neighborhoods and it both reflects the progress made in reducing ethno-sectarian violence in the Iraqi capital and identifies the areas that remain the most challenging.

As we have gone on the offensive in former Al Qaeda and insurgent sanctuaries, and as locals have increasingly supported our efforts, we have found a substantially increased number of arms, ammunition, and explosives caches. As this chart shows, we have, so far this year, already found and cleared over 4,400 caches, nearly 1,700 more than we discovered in all of last year. This may be a factor in the reduction in the number of overall improvised explosive device attacks in recent months, which as this chart shows, has declined sharply, by about one-third, since June.

The change in the security situation in Anbar Province has, of course, been particularly dramatic. As this chart shows, monthly attack levels in Anbar have declined from some 1,350 in October 2006 to a bit over 200 in August of this year. This dramatic decrease reflects the significance of the local rejection of Al Qaeda and the newfound willingness of local Anbaris to volunteer to serve in the Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police Service. As I noted earlier, we are seeing similar actions in other locations, as well.

To be sure, trends have not been uniformly positive across Iraq, as is shown by this chart depicting violence levels in several key Iraqi provinces. The trend in Ninevah Province, for example, has been much more up and down, until a recent decline, and the same is true in Sala ad Din Province, though recent trends there and in Baghdad have been in the right direction. In any event, the overall trajectory in Iraq - a steady decline of incidents in the past three months - is still quite significant.

The number of car bombings and suicide attacks has also declined in each of the past 5 months, from a high of some 175 in March, as this chart shows, to about 90 this past month. While this trend in recent months has been heartening, the number of high profile attacks is still too high, and we continue to work hard to destroy the networks that carry out these barbaric attacks.

Our operations have, in fact, produced substantial progress against Al Qaeda and its affiliates in Iraq. As this chart shows, in the past 8 months, we have considerably reduced the areas in which Al Qaeda enjoyed sanctuary. We have also neutralized 5 media cells, detained the senior Iraqi leader of Al Qaeda-Iraq, and killed or captured nearly 100 other key leaders and some 2,500 rank-and-file fighters. Al Qaeda is certainly not defeated; however, it is off balance and we are pursuing its leaders and operators aggressively. Of note, as the recent National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq explained, these gains against Al Qaeda are a result of the synergy of actions by: conventional forces to deny the terrorists sanctuary; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets to find the enemy; and special operations elements to conduct targeted raids. A combination of these assets is necessary to prevent the creation of a terrorist safe haven in Iraq.

In the past six months we have also targeted Shia militia extremists, capturing a number of senior leaders and fighters, as well as the deputy commander of Lebanese Hezbollah Department 2800, the organization created to support the training, arming, funding, and, in some cases, direction of the militia extremists by the Iranian Republican Guard Corps' Qods Force. These elements have assassinated and kidnapped Iraqi governmental leaders, killed and wounded our soldiers with advanced explosive devices provided by Iran, and indiscriminately rocketed civilians in the International Zone and elsewhere. It is increasingly apparent to both Coalition and Iraqi leaders that Iran, through the use of the Qods Force, seeks to turn the Iraqi Special Groups into a Hezbollah-like force to serve its interests and fight a proxy war against the Iraqi state and coalition forces in Iraq.

The most significant development in the past six months likely has been the increasing emergence of tribes and local citizens rejecting Al Qaeda and other extremists. This has, of course, been most visible in Anbar Province. A year ago the province was assessed as "lost" politically. Today, it is a model of what happens when local leaders and citizens decide to oppose Al Qaeda and reject its Taliban-like ideology. While Anbar is unique and the model it provides cannot be replicated everywhere in Iraq, it does demonstrate the dramatic change in security that is possible with the support and participation of local citizens. As this chart shows, other tribes have been inspired by the actions of those in Anbar and have volunteered to fight extremists as well. We have, in coordination with the Iraqi government's National Reconciliation Committee, been engaging these tribes and groups of local citizens who want to oppose extremists and to contribute to local security. Some 20,000 such individuals are already being hired for the Iraqi Police, thousands of others are being assimilated into the Iraqi Army, and thousands more are vying for a spot in Iraq's Security Forces.

Iraqi Security Forces

As I noted earlier, Iraqi Security Forces have continued to grow, to develop their capabilities, and to shoulder more of the burden of providing security for their country. Despite concerns about sectarian influence, inadequate logistics and supporting institutions, and an insufficient number of qualified commissioned and non-commissioned officers, Iraqi units are engaged around the country.

As this chart shows, there are now nearly 140 Iraqi Army, National Police, and Special Operations Forces Battalions in the fight, with about 95 of those capable of taking the lead in operations, albeit with some coalition support. Beyond that, all of Iraq's battalions have been heavily involved in combat operations that often result in the loss of leaders, soldiers, and equipment. These losses are among the shortcomings identified by operational readiness assessments, but we should not take from these assessments the impression that Iraqi forces are not in the fight and contributing. Indeed, despite their shortages, many Iraqi units across Iraq now operate with minimal coalition assistance.

As counterinsurgency operations require substantial numbers of boots on the ground, we are helping the Iraqis expand the size of their security forces. Currently, there are some 445,000 individuals on the payrolls of Iraq's Interior and Defense Ministries. Based on recent decisions by Prime Minister Maliki, the number of Iraq's security forces will grow further by the end of this year, possibly by as much as 40,000. Given the security challenges Iraq faces, we support this decision, and we will work with the two security ministries as they continue their efforts to expand their basic training capacity, leader development programs, logistical structures and elements, and various other institutional capabilities to support the substantial growth in Iraqi forces.

Significantly, in 2007, Iraq will, as in 2006, spend more on its security forces than it will receive in security assistance from the United States. In fact, Iraq is becoming one of the United States' larger foreign military sales customers, committing some $1.6 billion to FMS already, with the possibility of up to $1.8 billion more being committed before the end of this year. And I appreciate the attention that some members of Congress have recently given to speeding up the FMS process for Iraq.

To summarize, the security situation in Iraq is improving, and Iraqis elements are slowly taking on more of the responsibility for protecting their citizens. Innumerable challenges lie ahead; however, Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces have made progress toward achieving sustainable security. As a result, the United States will be in a position to reduce its forces in Iraq in the months ahead.

Recommendations

Two weeks ago I provided recommendations for the way ahead in Iraq to the members of my chain of command and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The essence of the approach I recommended is captured in its title: "Security While Transitioning: From Leading to Partnering to Overwatch." This approach seeks to build on the security improvements our troopers and our Iraqi counterparts have fought so hard to achieve in recent months. It reflects recognition of the importance of securing the population and the imperative of transitioning responsibilities to Iraqi institutions and Iraqi forces as quickly as possible, but without rushing to failure. It includes substantial support for the continuing development of Iraqi Security Forces. It also stresses the need to continue the counterinsurgency strategy that we have been employing, but with Iraqis gradually shouldering more of the load. And it highlights the importance of regional and global diplomatic approaches. Finally, in recognition of the fact that this war is not only being fought on the ground in Iraq but also in cyberspace, it also notes the need to contest the enemy's growing use of that important medium to spread extremism.

The recommendations I provided were informed by operational and strategic considerations. The operational considerations include recognition that:

• military aspects of the surge have achieved progress and generated momentum;
• Iraqi Security Forces have continued to grow and have slowly been shouldering more of the security burden in Iraq;

• a mission focus on either population security or transition alone will not be adequate to achieve our objectives;

• success against Al Qaeda-Iraq and Iranian-supported militia extremists requires conventional forces as well as special operations forces; and

• the security and local political situations will enable us to draw down the surge forces.


My recommendations also took into account a number of strategic considerations:

• political progress will take place only if sufficient security exists;
• long-term US ground force viability will benefit from force reductions as the surge runs its course;

• regional, global, and cyberspace initiatives are critical to success; and

• Iraqi leaders understandably want to assume greater sovereignty in their country, although, as they recently announced, they do desire continued presence of coalition forces in Iraq in 2008 under a new UN Security Council Resolution and, following that, they want to negotiate a long term security agreement with the United States and other nations.


Based on these considerations, and having worked the battlefield geometry with Lieutenant General Ray Odierno to ensure that we retain and build on the gains for which our troopers have fought, I have recommended a drawdown of the surge forces from Iraq. In fact, later this month, the Marine Expeditionary Unit deployed as part of the surge will depart Iraq. Beyond that, if my recommendations are approved, that unit's departure will be followed by the withdrawal of a brigade combat team without replacement in mid-December and the further redeployment without replacement of four other brigade combat teams and the two surge Marine battalions in the first 7 months of 2008, until we reach the pre-surge level of 15 brigade combat teams by mid-July 2008.

I would also like to discuss the period beyond next summer. Force reductions will continue beyond the pre-surge levels of brigade combat teams that we will reach by mid-July 2008; however, in my professional judgment, it would be premature to make recommendations on the pace of such reductions at this time. In fact, our experience in Iraq has repeatedly shown that projecting too far into the future is not just difficult, it can be misleading and even hazardous. The events of the past six months underscore that point. When I testified in January, for example, no one would have dared to forecast that Anbar Province would have been transformed the way it has in the past 6 months. Nor would anyone have predicted that volunteers in one-time Al Qaeda strongholds like Ghazaliyah in western Baghdad or in Adamiya in eastern Baghdad would seek to join the fight against Al Qaeda. Nor would we have anticipated that a Shia-led government would accept significant numbers of Sunni volunteers into the ranks of the local police force in Abu Ghraib. Beyond that, on a less encouraging note, none of us earlier this year appreciated the extent of Iranian involvement in Iraq, something about which we and Iraq's leaders all now have greater concern.

In view of this, I do not believe it is reasonable to have an adequate appreciation for the pace of further reductions and mission adjustments beyond the summer of 2008 until about mid-March of next year. We will, no later than that time, consider factors similar to those on which I based the current recommendations, having by then, of course, a better feel for the security situation, the improvements in the capabilities of our Iraqi counterparts, and the enemy situation. I will then, as I did in developing the recommendations I have explained here today, also take into consideration the demands on our Nation's ground forces, although I believe that that consideration should once again inform, not drive, the recommendations I make.

This chart captures the recommendations I have described, showing the recommended reduction of brigade combat teams as the surge runs its course and illustrating the concept of our units adjusting their missions and transitioning responsibilities to Iraqis, as the situation and Iraqi capabilities permit. It also reflects the no-later-than date for recommendations on force adjustments beyond next summer and provides a possible approach we have considered for the future force structure and mission set in Iraq.

One may argue that the best way to speed the process in Iraq is to change the MNF-I mission from one that emphasizes population security, counter-terrorism, and transition, to one that is strictly focused on transition and counter-terrorism. Making that change now would, in our view, be premature. We have learned before that there is a real danger in handing over tasks to the Iraqi Security Forces before their capacity and local conditions warrant. In fact, the drafters of the recently released National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq recognized this danger when they wrote, and I quote, "We assess that changing the mission of Coalition forces from a primarily counterinsurgency and stabilization role to a primary combat support role for Iraqi forces and counterterrorist operations to prevent AQI from establishing a safe haven would erode security gains achieved thus far."

In describing the recommendations I have made, I should note again that, like Ambassador Crocker, I believe Iraq's problems will require a long-term effort. There are no easy answers or quick solutions. And though we both believe this effort can succeed, it will take time. Our assessments underscore, in fact, the importance of recognizing that a premature drawdown of our forces would likely have devastating consequences.

That assessment is supported by the findings of a 16 August Defense Intelligence Agency report on the implications of a rapid withdrawal of US forces from Iraq. Summarizing it in an unclassified fashion, it concludes that a rapid withdrawal would result in the further release of the strong centrifugal forces in Iraq and produce a number of dangerous results, including a high risk of disintegration of the Iraqi Security Forces; rapid deterioration of local security initiatives; Al Qaeda-Iraq regaining lost ground and freedom of maneuver; a marked increase in violence and further ethno-sectarian displacement and refugee flows; alliances of convenience by Iraqi groups with internal and external forces to gain advantages over their rivals; and exacerbation of already challenging regional dynamics, especially with respect to Iran.

Lieutenant General Odierno and I share this assessment and believe that the best way to secure our national interests and avoid an unfavorable outcome in Iraq is to continue to focus our operations on securing the Iraqi people while targeting terrorist groups and militia extremists and, as quickly as conditions are met, transitioning security tasks to Iraqi elements.

Closing Comments

Before closing, I want to thank you and your colleagues for your support of our men and women in uniform in Iraq. The Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen with whom I'm honored to serve are the best equipped and, very likely, the most professional force in our nation's history. Impressively, despite all that has been asked of them in recent years, they continue to raise their right hands and volunteer to stay in uniform. With three weeks to go in this fiscal year, in fact, the Army elements in Iraq, for example, have achieved well over 130% of the reenlistment goals in the initial term and careerist categories and nearly 115% in the mid-career category. All of us appreciate what you have done to ensure that these great troopers have had what they've needed to accomplish their mission, just as we appreciate what you have done to take care of their families, as they, too, have made significant sacrifices in recent years.

The advances you have underwritten in weapons systems and individual equipment; in munitions; in command, control, and communications systems; in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities; in vehicles and counter-IED systems and programs; and in manned and unmanned aircraft have proven invaluable in Iraq. The capabilities that you have funded most recently - especially the vehicles that will provide greater protection against improvised explosive devices - are also of enormous importance. Additionally, your funding of the Commander's Emergency Response Program has given our leaders a critical tool with which to prosecute the counterinsurgency campaign. Finally, we appreciate as well your funding of our new detention programs and rule of law initiatives in Iraq.

In closing, it remains an enormous privilege to soldier again in Iraq with America's new "Greatest Generation." Our country's men and women in uniform have done a magnificent job in the most complex and challenging environment imaginable. All Americans should be very proud of their sons and daughters serving in Iraq today.

Thank you very much.

Ann Coulter Slams Democrats on War

Sunday, September 9, 2007

John Edwards - A New Strategy Against Terrorism

CIA agent says we're letting Bin Laden win




BY MICHAEL SCHEUER

Sunday, September 9th 2007, 4:00 AM

On the sixth 9/11 anniversary, Americans can see that Osama Bin Laden has taught them a valuable lesson about the moral and intellectual bankruptcy of the U.S.bipartisan governing elite. In 1989, Bin Laden famously told the mujahedeen that beating the U.S. would be easier than defeating the U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan because Americans are soft, impatient, risk averse and afraid to offend their effete European role models by fully using U.S. military power.

Osama was wrong about our military's courage — it is fighting superbly against long odds — but dead right regarding our elected and high-ranking appointed officials, Republicans and Democrats alike.

The moral cowards governing us today have handed Afghanistan to Bin Laden. Instead of sending a half-million troops to that country, sealing its border with Pakistan, annihilating anyone who fought us, and then coming home, President Bush listened to then-CIA director George Tenet's promise that bribery and a few CIA and U.S.Special Forces officers would win the war. Tenet's recipe let about 60,000 Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters go home with their guns and missed Bin Laden at Tora Bora.

And as for those now aspiring to the presidency, I don't hear a single voice — Democrat or Republican — claiming we should have wielded far more force there.

As a result of this cowardice, today we are fighting a more numerous and better trained and armed foe. Meanwhile, Bin Laden and his boys sit unmolested on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, planning more attacks in America because our bipartisan elite long ago delegated America's protection to a beleaguered Third World dictator.

On balance, Bin Laden and Al Qaeda are more threatening today than on 9/11. As the July National Intelligence Estimate reported, the core of Al Qaeda is rebuilt, aiding Iraqi and Afghan insurgents, and preparing attacks in the United States. Worse, the proliferation of Al Qaeda-inspired, homegrown groups in the West is accelerating, as we saw last week in Germany and Denmark.

Bin Laden is doing well militarily: He commands a potent organization, and is instigating a new worldwide threat that is nearly impossible to detect, let alone preempt. The lies of U.S. political leaders do not help us face down our foe. They say Bin Laden, et. al are primarily motivated by their hatred of America's freedoms. Not so. The impact of our policy is the Islamists' core motivation and a glue of unity for that ethnically and linguistically diverse crowd.

The second oft-heard lie is that America is safer than on 9/11. But our governing elite has knowingly failed to accomplish its two most vital post-9/11 tasks: controlling U.S. borders and fully securing the former Soviet Union's nuclear weapons.

Because of this criminal neglect, no level of American law enforcement has a fighting chance to stop the next attack, unless an obviously deranged guy, wearing a Bin Laden T-shirt and carrying a clearly labeled Soviet nuke, comes through an official entry point.

So on this 9/11, we must accept this sad and infuriating reality: Bin Laden is winning. He has defied us, attacked us, eluded us and inspired new threats we cannot begin to enumerate.

To be victorious in this long war, we must get smarter and more ruthless. That means reducing U.S. intervention in the Muslim world, keeping policies essential to U.S. security and unloading those that undermine it — like energy dependence on the Saudi and other Gulf regimes. This will start to deflect Islamist and Muslim ire onto their main enemy, the Arab world's Islamofascist rulers.

Second, we must ignore international opinion and apply overwhelming military force on Islamists and their abettors whenever necessary to defend America. This will cost Bin Laden much of the popular support generated by some current U.S. policies.

As this support erodes, the Islamists can be destroyed by men and women descended from those who delivered catastrophe to America's German and Japanese enemies.

Scheuer served in the CIA for 22 years, and was chief of the Bin Laden unit at the agency's counterterrorist center from 1996 to 1999. He is the author of "Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror."

6 Years Later - Are We Safer?


SIX YEARS LATER
Are we safer today?
Six Years After 9/11 and Three Years After the 9/11 Report, Is the U.S. Ready to Get Serious About Terrorism?
Sunday, September 9, 2007; Page B01


Are we safer today?

Two years ago, we and our colleagues issued a report card assessing the U.S. government's progress on the bipartisan recommendations in the 9/11 commission report. We concluded that the nation was not safe enough. Our judgment remains the same today: We still lack a sense of urgency in the face of grave danger.

The U.S. homeland confronts a "persistent and evolving terrorist threat," especially from al-Qaeda, according to a National Intelligence Estimate issued in July. Six years after the attacks, following a series of ambitious reforms carried out by dedicated officials, how is it possible that the threat remains so dire?

The answer stems from a mixed record of reform, a lack of focus and a resilient foe. Progress at home -- in our ability to detect, prevent and respond to terrorist attacks -- has been difficult, incomplete and slow, but

it has been real. Outside our borders, however, the threat of failure looms. We face a rising tide of radicalization and rage in the Muslim world -- a trend to which our own actions have contributed. The enduring threat is not Osama bin Laden but young Muslims with no jobs and no hope, who are angry with their own governments and increasingly see the United States as an enemy of Islam.

Four years ago, then-Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld famously asked his advisers: "Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us?"

The answer is no.

U.S. foreign policy has not stemmed the rising tide of extremism in the Muslim world. In July 2004, the 9/11 commission recommended putting foreign policy at the center of our counterterrorism efforts. Instead, we have lost ground.

Our report warned that it was imperative to eliminate terrorist sanctuaries. But inside Pakistan, al-Qaeda "has protected or regenerated key elements of its homeland attack capability," according to the National Intelligence Estimate. The chief threat to Afghanistan's young democracy comes from across the Pakistani border, from the resurgent Taliban. Pakistan should take the lead in closing Taliban camps and rooting out al-Qaeda. But the United States must act if Pakistan will not.

We are also failing in the struggle of ideas. We have not been persuasive in enlisting the energy and sympathy of the world's 1.3 billion Muslims against the extremist threat. That is not because of who we are: Polling data consistently show strong support in the Muslim world for American values, including our political system and respect for human rights, liberty and equality. Rather, U.S. policy choices have undermined support.

No word is more poisonous to the reputation of the United States than Guantanamo. Fundamental justice requires a fair legal process before the U.S. government detains people for significant periods of time, and the president and Congress have not provided one. Guantanamo Bay should be closed now. The 9/11 commission recommended developing a "coalition approach" for the detention and treatment of terrorists -- a policy that would be legally sustainable, internationally viable and far better for U.S. credibility.

Moreover, no question inflames public opinion in the Muslim world more than the Arab-Israeli dispute. To empower Muslim moderates, we must take away the extremists' most potent grievance: the charge that the United States does not care about the Palestinians. A vigorous diplomatic effort, with the visible, active support of the president, would bolster America's prestige and influence -- and offer the best prospect for Israel's long-term security.
And finally, no conflict drains more time, attention, blood, treasure and support from our worldwide counterterrorism efforts than the war in Iraq. It has become a powerful recruiting and training tool for al-Qaeda.

Beyond all our problems in the Muslim world, we must not neglect the most dangerous threat of all. The 9/11 commission urged a "maximum effort" to prevent the nightmare scenario: a nuclear weapon in the hands of terrorists. The recent National Intelligence Estimate says that al-Qaeda will continue to try to acquire weapons of mass destruction and that it would not hesitate to use them. But our response to the threat of nuclear terrorism has been lip service and little action. The fiscal 2008 budget request for programs to control nuclear warheads, materials and expertise is a 15 percent real cut from the levels two years ago. We are in dire need of leadership, resources and sustained diplomacy to secure the world's loose nuclear materials. President Bush needs to knock heads and force action.


Military power is essential to our security, but if the only tool is a hammer, pretty soon every problem looks like a nail. We must use all the tools of U.S. power -- including foreign aid, educational assistance and vigorous public diplomacy that emphasizes scholarship, libraries and exchange programs -- to shape a Middle East and a Muslim world that are less hostile to our interests and values. America's long-term security relies on being viewed not as a threat but as a source of opportunity and hope.

At home, the situation is less dire, but progress has been limited.

Some badly needed structures have been built. In 2004, Congress created a director of national intelligence to unify the efforts of the 16 agencies that make up the U.S. intelligence community. The new DNI, Mike McConnell, must now take charge and become the dynamic, bold leader the commission envisioned, rather than just another bureaucratic layer. He has recognized the importance of sharing intelligence, of moving from a culture based on the "need to know" to one based on the need to share, as we recommended in our report. But he is still struggling to gain control of budgets and personnel. No DNI will be able to make reform last without significant time in the job and strong support from the president.

Congress also created the National Counterterrorism Center, where CIA analysts, FBI agents and other experts from across the government sit side by side and share intelligence continuously. This is a clear improvement over the pre-9/11 way of doing business, but those inside the center still face restrictions on what they can share with their home agency -- a disturbing echo of failed practices. State and local officials also complain that they are not getting the information they need.

In 2004, George J. Tenet, then the director of central intelligence, testified that it would take five years to fix the CIA. Three years later, we have seen signs of progress, but it is not fixed yet. Flush with resources, the CIA is investing heavily in training intelligence analysts and improving its ability to collect information on terrorist targets, particularly by agents on the ground. Disappointingly, despite recruitment drives, only 8 percent of the CIA's new hires have the ethnic backgrounds and language skills most needed for counterterrorism.

A wider problem is that, because of intelligence failures (notably involving Iraq and 9/11) and controversial policies (notably about abuse and interrogation), the public lacks confidence in the CIA. That is not good for the agency or the country. We recognize that intelligence agencies must keep many secrets, but more candor and openness are the only ways to win sustained public support for the reforms we still need.

The FBI, the agency responsible for domestic intelligence, also has much more to do. The number of bureau intelligence analysts has more than doubled since 9/11 (to about 2,100), but they are still second-class citizens in the FBI's law-enforcement culture. Modern 21st-century information systems are not yet in place, and top positions are turning over too often. Six years after 9/11, the FBI's essential unit on weapons of mass destruction is just beginning its work.

When it comes to transportation security -- the failure so basic to 9/11 -- we have seen some successes. For example, the Terrorist Screening Center has a football-field-size room filled with a giant electronic board and dozens of experts who track the flight manifests of 2,500 international flights arriving in the United States each day. But the prescreening of passengers is still left to the airlines, which lack access to complete watch lists of suspected terrorists. Congress mandated national standards for secure driver's licenses but has not given states the money to make it happen. Moreover, technological improvement has been far too slow. A pilot program of high-tech explosive-detecting "puffer devices" at airports is of doubtful effectiveness and has been delayed indefinitely. Advanced baggage-screening systems will not be in place until 2024. That timeline may work for our grandchildren, but it won't work for us.

Nor will the pace of efforts to prepare the country to respond to future attacks. Congress passed a better formula for distributing federal homeland-security grants to the states on the basis of risk and vulnerability, rather than pork and politics. But the new law still allows the broadcast industry until February 2009 to hand over the prime slice of the broadcast spectrum that police and firefighters need to beam radio messages through concrete and steel. Disaster could well strike before then.

We also lack a legal framework for fighting terrorism without sacrificing civil liberties. The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board created in response to our recommendations has been missing in action. The board has raised no objections to wiretaps without warrants and to troubling detention and interrogation practices. It even let the White House edit its annual report. Now strengthened by a new law, the board must become a firm public voice in support of civil liberties.

Finally, there's the question of Congress. Three years ago, we said that strengthening congressional oversight of counterterrorism was among the most difficult and important of our recommendations. Congressional oversight of homeland security and intelligence must be robust and effective. It is not. Three years ago, the 9/11 commission noted that the Department of Homeland Security reported to 88 congressional committees and subcommittees -- a major drain on senior management and a source of contradictory guidance. After halfhearted reforms followed by steps backward, that number is now 86.

Those are just the main items on our list of concerns. Six years later, we are safer in a narrow sense: We have not been attacked, and our defenses are better. But we have become distracted and complacent. We call on the presidential candidates to spell out how they would organize their administrations and act urgently to address the threat. And we call on ordinary citizens to demand more leadership from our elected representatives. The terrible losses our country suffered on 9/11 should have catalyzed efforts to create an America that is safer, stronger and wiser. We still have a long way to go.


Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton are the former chairman and vice chairman of the 9/11 commission.

Friday, September 7, 2007